I will argue that the claim that “meaning cannot be separated from the practices and assumptions of the people using it” is false if we are referring to the meaning of words in a spoken language, and the ‘assumptions’ in question are not synonymous with the common meaning of words (which would make the claim trivial).
Words must have general meaning beyond any unique context for them to be intelligibly ‘used’ in a context; otherwise all spoken languages would amount to a ‘private language’, therefore unintelligible.
We could extend the idea of language to include phenomena, but then the same limitation applies: phenomena must be commonly understood to the intelligibly and consistently identified when perceived in any unique context.
So, I argue that the sense of words and phenomena can be separated from the particular, situational context and individual assumptions; the uniqueness of the context can be meaningfully identified (make sense) only in terms that are already meaningful in general, verifiable/refutable, whereas individual assumptions about meaning may be wrong (refuted), which requires a standard of meaning. As such, there is nothing about any unique context that has excess meaning beyond the general terms of identification in a unique, situational configuration. Any augmentation of the general meaning that may arise from a situation is an intentional, creative action of a language user who intends to persuade other users (in standard terms) to accept and integrate their proposed augmentation into the standard.
Thanks you for taking the time to read my little piece and engage with it.
However, I do not think your critique, by conflating context-dependence with subjectivism, and flexibility with chaos. does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s position.
I do not think he argues that words lack general meaning or that each utterance invents new definitions. Rather, he claims that meaning is rooted in public use, not fixed by abstract definitions but established through shared practices within what he calls forms of life. This is why language remains intelligible: we participate in socially governed norms, not private mental acts (see §43, Philosophical Investigations):
"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."
This does not imply that each speaker generates a new meaning every time they speak. It means that meanings are rooted in norm-governed practices. These norms are what enable intelligibility in the first place, not the timeless fixity of definitions, but their stability through shared usage.
Your concern that language would become a “private language” if meaning were too context-bound is, I think, precisely the position Wittgenstein critiques. A private language, meaning one intelligible only to a single speaker, is impossible because no public standard could confirm or correct it. Wittgenstein insists that rule-following and meaning are social rather than individual (see §§201–202).
As for creativity in language use, Wittgenstein would agree. Speakers often extend or reshape meaning. But such innovation makes sense only against a background of communal understanding. Meaning shifts, but it does so within stable practices, not through isolated assumptions.
In short, I would agrgue that Wittgenstein does not deny general meaning, but rather that he redefines it as something lived and shared, not something abstractly fixed. That is why language works, and why it is not reducible to either private impressions or rigid definitions.
I mostly agree with this, and I ought to clarify that I was not arguing against Wittgenstein but only reflecting on the scope of meaning of the phrase: “meaning cannot be separated from practices and assumptions”. Judging by the quote “For a large class of cases—though not for all…” it seems that Wittgenstein agrees that not ALL meaning is determined by its use, so may also agree that some meaning can be separated from any normalised practices and assumptions (social grounding). Specifically, concepts such as “use”, “sense” or “self” seem to be context invariant, as are the law of logic that underpin their intelligibility.
Nevertheless, every moment in life, every experience is unique in every measurable property, so the basis of identification of similarity and sameness that comprises their common meaning must come before social practices, uses and assumptions, which already presuppose co-existence and identification of ‘the same world’ at different times and by different people. If this is right then all social meaning is built on top of some more fundamental language that cannot be spoken, but is intrinsic to being, and the use and innovation of language is ultimately regulated by it.
It is helpful to know that your original intention was not to oppose Wittgenstein's view outright but to interrogate the scope of claims like “meaning cannot be separated from practices and assumptions.” You are quite right to cite Wittgenstein’s own qualification—“for a large class of cases, though not for all…”—reminding us that he did not propose a total theory of meaning but rather sought to shift focus away from overly abstract accounts.
That said, we would raise a few points in response to your suggestion that concepts such as “use”, “sense”, or “self” are context-invariant. While they may appear to function across contexts, their intelligibility is still shaped by our ways of talking about them. I suspect Wittgenstein would ask us not to look for the essence of these terms but for how they are used in different language games. The term “self”, for example, operates very differently in a psychological, legal, or philosophical discussion.
Your point that identity and similarity must be possible prior to any shared practice is deeply metaphysical, Wouldn't Wittgenstein resist the temptation to seek a foundation outside of use altogether? In "On Certainty", he hints that what we call foundational is not beyond language but embedded in our forms of life, functioning as a kind of bedrock we do not question rather than a transcendent language of being. That being the case, the claim that there exists a “more fundamental language that cannot be spoken” would run counter to Wittgenstein’s deflationary view of metaphysical explanations.
I find your framing of the tension between what must be in place for language to be possible at all, and what language reveals about the nature of those preconditions, rich and exciting. This is an ongoing issue for which Wittgenstein may not offer the last word, but his emphasis on practice remains a valid challenge to views that seek meaning outside the horizon of shared human activity.
‘Self’ is a word in a spoken language, but I fail to see how its meaning differs in different contexts. There is a sense that the term carries that does not change: self-reference, and the alleged differences seem to be associated with a different word, ‘me’, which refers to the object that self-refers rather than to self-reference itself. We cannot even describe this root sense in any other words, without using ‘self’ in its description. The root sense is linguistically irreducible. Its meaning is so definitive that it has the status of a fundamental law: the law of identity. The law certainly does not change from context to context.
We could of course agree to redefine the word ‘self’, for example, as a code word, but even this would not erase our understanding of the root sense. In fact, whenever we speak a language we already affirm that root sense, as a presupposition of using language, so I maintain that there is a meaning of ‘self’ that is fixed for all uses of language.
Thank you
I will argue that the claim that “meaning cannot be separated from the practices and assumptions of the people using it” is false if we are referring to the meaning of words in a spoken language, and the ‘assumptions’ in question are not synonymous with the common meaning of words (which would make the claim trivial).
Words must have general meaning beyond any unique context for them to be intelligibly ‘used’ in a context; otherwise all spoken languages would amount to a ‘private language’, therefore unintelligible.
We could extend the idea of language to include phenomena, but then the same limitation applies: phenomena must be commonly understood to the intelligibly and consistently identified when perceived in any unique context.
So, I argue that the sense of words and phenomena can be separated from the particular, situational context and individual assumptions; the uniqueness of the context can be meaningfully identified (make sense) only in terms that are already meaningful in general, verifiable/refutable, whereas individual assumptions about meaning may be wrong (refuted), which requires a standard of meaning. As such, there is nothing about any unique context that has excess meaning beyond the general terms of identification in a unique, situational configuration. Any augmentation of the general meaning that may arise from a situation is an intentional, creative action of a language user who intends to persuade other users (in standard terms) to accept and integrate their proposed augmentation into the standard.
Thanks you for taking the time to read my little piece and engage with it.
However, I do not think your critique, by conflating context-dependence with subjectivism, and flexibility with chaos. does not do justice to Wittgenstein’s position.
I do not think he argues that words lack general meaning or that each utterance invents new definitions. Rather, he claims that meaning is rooted in public use, not fixed by abstract definitions but established through shared practices within what he calls forms of life. This is why language remains intelligible: we participate in socially governed norms, not private mental acts (see §43, Philosophical Investigations):
"For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word 'meaning' it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."
This does not imply that each speaker generates a new meaning every time they speak. It means that meanings are rooted in norm-governed practices. These norms are what enable intelligibility in the first place, not the timeless fixity of definitions, but their stability through shared usage.
Your concern that language would become a “private language” if meaning were too context-bound is, I think, precisely the position Wittgenstein critiques. A private language, meaning one intelligible only to a single speaker, is impossible because no public standard could confirm or correct it. Wittgenstein insists that rule-following and meaning are social rather than individual (see §§201–202).
As for creativity in language use, Wittgenstein would agree. Speakers often extend or reshape meaning. But such innovation makes sense only against a background of communal understanding. Meaning shifts, but it does so within stable practices, not through isolated assumptions.
In short, I would agrgue that Wittgenstein does not deny general meaning, but rather that he redefines it as something lived and shared, not something abstractly fixed. That is why language works, and why it is not reducible to either private impressions or rigid definitions.
I mostly agree with this, and I ought to clarify that I was not arguing against Wittgenstein but only reflecting on the scope of meaning of the phrase: “meaning cannot be separated from practices and assumptions”. Judging by the quote “For a large class of cases—though not for all…” it seems that Wittgenstein agrees that not ALL meaning is determined by its use, so may also agree that some meaning can be separated from any normalised practices and assumptions (social grounding). Specifically, concepts such as “use”, “sense” or “self” seem to be context invariant, as are the law of logic that underpin their intelligibility.
Nevertheless, every moment in life, every experience is unique in every measurable property, so the basis of identification of similarity and sameness that comprises their common meaning must come before social practices, uses and assumptions, which already presuppose co-existence and identification of ‘the same world’ at different times and by different people. If this is right then all social meaning is built on top of some more fundamental language that cannot be spoken, but is intrinsic to being, and the use and innovation of language is ultimately regulated by it.
It is helpful to know that your original intention was not to oppose Wittgenstein's view outright but to interrogate the scope of claims like “meaning cannot be separated from practices and assumptions.” You are quite right to cite Wittgenstein’s own qualification—“for a large class of cases, though not for all…”—reminding us that he did not propose a total theory of meaning but rather sought to shift focus away from overly abstract accounts.
That said, we would raise a few points in response to your suggestion that concepts such as “use”, “sense”, or “self” are context-invariant. While they may appear to function across contexts, their intelligibility is still shaped by our ways of talking about them. I suspect Wittgenstein would ask us not to look for the essence of these terms but for how they are used in different language games. The term “self”, for example, operates very differently in a psychological, legal, or philosophical discussion.
Your point that identity and similarity must be possible prior to any shared practice is deeply metaphysical, Wouldn't Wittgenstein resist the temptation to seek a foundation outside of use altogether? In "On Certainty", he hints that what we call foundational is not beyond language but embedded in our forms of life, functioning as a kind of bedrock we do not question rather than a transcendent language of being. That being the case, the claim that there exists a “more fundamental language that cannot be spoken” would run counter to Wittgenstein’s deflationary view of metaphysical explanations.
I find your framing of the tension between what must be in place for language to be possible at all, and what language reveals about the nature of those preconditions, rich and exciting. This is an ongoing issue for which Wittgenstein may not offer the last word, but his emphasis on practice remains a valid challenge to views that seek meaning outside the horizon of shared human activity.
‘Self’ is a word in a spoken language, but I fail to see how its meaning differs in different contexts. There is a sense that the term carries that does not change: self-reference, and the alleged differences seem to be associated with a different word, ‘me’, which refers to the object that self-refers rather than to self-reference itself. We cannot even describe this root sense in any other words, without using ‘self’ in its description. The root sense is linguistically irreducible. Its meaning is so definitive that it has the status of a fundamental law: the law of identity. The law certainly does not change from context to context.
We could of course agree to redefine the word ‘self’, for example, as a code word, but even this would not erase our understanding of the root sense. In fact, whenever we speak a language we already affirm that root sense, as a presupposition of using language, so I maintain that there is a meaning of ‘self’ that is fixed for all uses of language.