You describe how language works (according to Chomsky's theory, OK) without mentioning "context" and "aboutness". Sentences are not generated in vacuum.
This is a fair comment. I try to narrow each piece i write to one or two key themes. If you scroll the 40 or so articles I have written so far you will find i also talk about context, deixis and many other ways to look at language
But there is still the open question of the recognition of an object as “the same” object (for you and I), which can then be given “the same” name (for you and I). I argued that ‘the Face’ is the first language (chronologically speaking) but the physical world is also a language, an object language that grounds all spoken languages, which are in fact only meta-languages. The object language keeps evolving as out ideas about the world change, and so does the meta-language, but the first language (mutual recognition as the Face) is the foundation of this collective evolution of meaning. The physical then includes anything we can say about “the brain”; it is already a part of our common language.
I will start with my terms. The Face is just what we mean by the word ‘face’ in our relating to any other person: the sense of mutual recognition as beings of the same kind is (i argue) grounded in the experience of other faces, therefore in the meaning of the idea of ‘face’. Yes, close to Levinas, with some theoretic extension. This is the basis of social reflexivity that grounds metal-languages (natural languages) outside of my-self (hence there is no private language).
I use the term ‘object language’ in roughly the same sense as Tarski (the meaning we speak ‘about’ or signify in any ‘meta-language’). I argue that the fundamental object-language (physical reality) is a meaning-construct common to all humanity, evolved conceptually, and highly integrated with the concept of individual body and the face, phenomenologically meaningful to all beings of our kind by virtue of our innately conceiving of ourselves as being embodied. Our physiology is already an expression of that language. Nevertheless, since all situations are contextually unique, there is room for error, for misunderstanding of the physical language, which has a degree of vagueness.
I think this also addresses the twin earth problem, in regard to the social grounding of all meaning.
Thank you for clarifying your terms—your argument is certainly an interesting one, particularly in its intersection between Levinasian ethics and a broadly Tarskian linguistic framework. If I understand you correctly, you see the recognition of the Face as foundational to all meaning-making, grounding our capacity for social reflexivity and shared linguistic structures. You then extend Tarski’s object/meta-language distinction to argue that the physical world itself functions as a kind of fundamental object language, evolving in tandem with human conceptual understanding.
I have a few questions, if I may. If the ‘Face’ is the primary ground for meaning, would you argue that it necessarily precedes all symbolic systems—including, say, gesture or proto-language? And if the object language (physical reality) is itself a meaning-construct, to what extent do you see it as socially constructed versus arising from some pre-linguistic cognitive structures? Lastly, your point about vagueness in the interpretation of the physical world is intriguing—does this suggest that even the ‘object language’ is subject to the same indeterminacy we find in spoken language, or do you see a fundamental distinction in how meaning is derived in each case?
I appreciate your perspective and would be interested to see how you position this argument relative to discussions of embodiment in cognitive linguistics or Wittgenstein’s critique of private language.
I regard the ‘face’, or better, the recognition of faces, as the first instance of reflexive consciousness, of self-ideation, and therefore of any ‘meaningful’ content of thought ‘for’ the self. So, on the timeline of meaning, there is nothing before that, no pre-conditions of pre-existing structures, although we can and have of course conceived of a world in which the etiology of our conscious, meaningful existence in explained terms of such structures. Nevertheless, since time is also a property of consciousness it does not quite make sense to talk about ‘time’ before consciousness or about ‘beginning’ of consciousness; time itself has emerged with consciousness. It is not necessarily the case that mutual recognition ‘emerged’ or ‘begun’ but simply that it is, and that it has necessary logical conditions that are presupposed by self-awareness.
In any case, if we take face-recognition or the recognition of another-being-like-me as the first concept, possibly with some additional minimal context, we can conceive of the ideation of the world to evolve from that minimal context. In this model everything is language, the world is a language, and there is nothing outside of language, and languages can be built on top of one another. For example, we could commonly conceive of what trees are like in the same way as we conceive of what human bodies are like, be able to point at a tree and expect another self to understand what we are pointing at, and then give trees a name in a higher-order language that could be spoken.
I think the vagueness of the object language is of the same scope as the vagueness of natural languages, or else we would never disagree about what we see. Since we can disagree about perceptions and how to categorise them, just like we can disagree about interpretations of linguistic expressions and whether it fits some unique perception, vagueness is necessary to accomodate new experiences, new transformations of meaning, or else nothing would fit, since everything we experience is in some sense unique.
Your argument presents a really interesting synthesis of phenomenology, linguistics, and logic, particularly in linking Wittgenstein’s private language argument to a broader theory of meaning rooted in mutual recognition. I appreciate the clarity with which you frame the idea that meaning cannot be privately maintained and must be socially preserved. Your argument that a private language would either be redundant (because meaning is already understood in the present) or lost (if memory fails) provides a strong reinforcement of Wittgenstein’s thesis.
However, I’d like to probe a few areas further:
1. The Face as the First Meaningful Structure
Your claim that ‘the Face’—or, more precisely, the recognition of another-being-like-me—is the fundamental basis for meaning is compelling, particularly from a phenomenological perspective. Levinas, as you acknowledge, also sees the face-to-face encounter as the foundation of ethical and intersubjective experience. But does this position require rejecting the idea that meaning arises from pre-existing cognitive structures? That is, could one not argue that face-recognition itself depends on underlying neurological and evolutionary mechanisms? If so, would it not follow that some aspects of meaning predate mutual recognition, rather than emerging from it?
Additionally, by positing recognition as logically prior to all meaning, does this exclude cases where solitary cognitive processes (such as problem-solving, abstract thought, or even sensory perception) generate proto-meaning before social interaction occurs? Or is your claim that meaning is only meaningful when it is potentially shared?
2. The World as an ‘Object Language’
Your argument that physical reality itself constitutes a kind of "object language," evolving conceptually alongside human thought, is intriguing. But does this mean that the world itself is language, or merely that our understanding of it is always mediated through conceptual and linguistic structures? If the former, does this not risk collapsing the distinction between representation and reality?
Many linguistic and cognitive theories distinguish between the external world (which exists independently of our descriptions) and the linguistic/conceptual systems we impose upon it. Even Wittgenstein’s later work suggests that while language shapes our reality, it does not constitute it. How does your position engage with this distinction?
3. Vagueness in Object Language vs. Natural Language
Your analogy between vagueness in natural language and vagueness in the ‘object language’ is a strong one. We do, after all, disagree both about words and about how to categorise what we see. However, is vagueness a feature of the world itself, or a byproduct of how we describe it? In natural language, vagueness often stems from semantic flexibility, but in perception, it seems more tied to interpretative uncertainty or cognitive limitations. Would you say the vagueness of the ‘object language’ is an intrinsic feature of reality, or does it arise because all categorisation is necessarily approximate?
4. The Private Language Argument and Circularity
Your point about the impossibility of self-enforcing rules in private language is well stated. However, could the same circularity problem apply to public language? After all, linguistic meaning in public discourse is still maintained through mutual reinforcement within a system that refers to itself. If self-referentiality does not collapse public language, why must it necessarily collapse private language?
Additionally, does your argument about the ‘Face’ extend Wittgenstein’s private language argument beyond the linguistic into the ontological? That is, if mutual recognition is the foundation of meaning, then does that mean that all being is necessarily relational? If so, would this mean that the very concept of an ‘isolated mind’ (as in Descartes’ cogito) is fundamentally incoherent?
Your perspective provides a thought-provoking expansion of the private language argument, bringing in phenomenology, social cognition, and even metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and meaning. If your model fully holds, it seems to suggest a fundamentally relational account of existence itself, where there is no ‘self’ without recognition by an ‘other,’ and no meaning without a shared frame of reference. Would you see this as the natural conclusion of your position?
I really appreciate the depth of your argument, and I’d be interested in hearing how you see these questions playing into your broader philosophical framework."
1. When we speak of pre-cognitive conditions we are apply the standard model in which meaning is implicitly divided into two domains: objective reality and subjective thinking. We then purport to explain the former in terms of the latter. This works very well for most purposes, for individual/subjective consciousness, but at the point where we want to examine the beginning of all meaning, or the beginning of all consciousness, the model is revealed as logically inconsistent: it posits that there was meaning before there was the ability to think it, as if the concept of a tree existed before there were mounds that could define what a ‘tree’ means. The same applies to all concepts, including the idea of the pre-cognitive conditions of perception, including time. The cleanest way to consistently answer the question at this limit is to recognise that meaning therefore consciousness is all there is, that it is intrinsically a multiplicity of selves (each with its self-evident ‘I am’) which stabilises the distinction between the objective (the world as we know it) and the subjective (thoughts about the world as we know it). I first formulated and proven this model here: https://philpapers.org/rec/KOWODO, but a more developed statement of it is articulated in my recent book: https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/announcing-book-release
2. Calling the objective reality a language is a matter of classification; it need not be called that if someone insists otherwise, provided they describe it consistently. I use the term language because it fits its logical structure, which is that of constructed or evolved meaning that can change in time, that the meaning of physical properties is not absolutely fixed for all time, nor does it have an exact meaning that can be discovered. In that sense the label ‘language’, an object language, makes sense and avoids the false implication that it is exact and immutable in its meaning content. So I am not struck on the term, but I think it is a good fit for explaining how we communicate about the same world and how its meaning evolves for consciousness.
3. I think the above comments already capture this question.
4. Self-referentiality is logically inconsistent, so it collapses everything to non-sense, but it does not apply to public language because it is grounded by the intrinsic multiplicity of consciousness, which imperfectly mediates its relational closure without collapsing to direct-self reference. The imperfect references from self to self (vagueness) create a permanent misalignment, imbalance of meaning, therefore systemic non-closure, which is continuously compensated by consciousness changing in time.
The multiplicity relativises all instances of individuality by imperfect, mediated reference. This is precisely what makes consciousness possible and is therefore presupposed by consciousness, and goes back to the argument in the paper cited above. Yes, i consider it formally proven (in that paper) that the concept of a completely isolated mind, a monadic mind, is fundamentally incoherent.
You describe how language works (according to Chomsky's theory, OK) without mentioning "context" and "aboutness". Sentences are not generated in vacuum.
Let me share with you two of my posts:
https://alexandernaumenko.substack.com/p/the-pointing-role-of-language
https://alexandernaumenko.substack.com/p/symbolic-communication
I hope those ideas will help in your research.
This is a fair comment. I try to narrow each piece i write to one or two key themes. If you scroll the 40 or so articles I have written so far you will find i also talk about context, deixis and many other ways to look at language
But there is still the open question of the recognition of an object as “the same” object (for you and I), which can then be given “the same” name (for you and I). I argued that ‘the Face’ is the first language (chronologically speaking) but the physical world is also a language, an object language that grounds all spoken languages, which are in fact only meta-languages. The object language keeps evolving as out ideas about the world change, and so does the meta-language, but the first language (mutual recognition as the Face) is the foundation of this collective evolution of meaning. The physical then includes anything we can say about “the brain”; it is already a part of our common language.
Thanks for reading my piece and your comments. I think you are in part asking the twin earth question (Hilary Putman). I wrote something here https://open.substack.com/pub/linguistically/p/twin-earth-meaning-and-the-mind?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=4mukj5 , but if you could define your terms, such 'object language', 'face' (am thinking Levinas and face being the first language), that would help me understand better, I think.
I will start with my terms. The Face is just what we mean by the word ‘face’ in our relating to any other person: the sense of mutual recognition as beings of the same kind is (i argue) grounded in the experience of other faces, therefore in the meaning of the idea of ‘face’. Yes, close to Levinas, with some theoretic extension. This is the basis of social reflexivity that grounds metal-languages (natural languages) outside of my-self (hence there is no private language).
I use the term ‘object language’ in roughly the same sense as Tarski (the meaning we speak ‘about’ or signify in any ‘meta-language’). I argue that the fundamental object-language (physical reality) is a meaning-construct common to all humanity, evolved conceptually, and highly integrated with the concept of individual body and the face, phenomenologically meaningful to all beings of our kind by virtue of our innately conceiving of ourselves as being embodied. Our physiology is already an expression of that language. Nevertheless, since all situations are contextually unique, there is room for error, for misunderstanding of the physical language, which has a degree of vagueness.
I think this also addresses the twin earth problem, in regard to the social grounding of all meaning.
Thank you for clarifying your terms—your argument is certainly an interesting one, particularly in its intersection between Levinasian ethics and a broadly Tarskian linguistic framework. If I understand you correctly, you see the recognition of the Face as foundational to all meaning-making, grounding our capacity for social reflexivity and shared linguistic structures. You then extend Tarski’s object/meta-language distinction to argue that the physical world itself functions as a kind of fundamental object language, evolving in tandem with human conceptual understanding.
I have a few questions, if I may. If the ‘Face’ is the primary ground for meaning, would you argue that it necessarily precedes all symbolic systems—including, say, gesture or proto-language? And if the object language (physical reality) is itself a meaning-construct, to what extent do you see it as socially constructed versus arising from some pre-linguistic cognitive structures? Lastly, your point about vagueness in the interpretation of the physical world is intriguing—does this suggest that even the ‘object language’ is subject to the same indeterminacy we find in spoken language, or do you see a fundamental distinction in how meaning is derived in each case?
I appreciate your perspective and would be interested to see how you position this argument relative to discussions of embodiment in cognitive linguistics or Wittgenstein’s critique of private language.
I regard the ‘face’, or better, the recognition of faces, as the first instance of reflexive consciousness, of self-ideation, and therefore of any ‘meaningful’ content of thought ‘for’ the self. So, on the timeline of meaning, there is nothing before that, no pre-conditions of pre-existing structures, although we can and have of course conceived of a world in which the etiology of our conscious, meaningful existence in explained terms of such structures. Nevertheless, since time is also a property of consciousness it does not quite make sense to talk about ‘time’ before consciousness or about ‘beginning’ of consciousness; time itself has emerged with consciousness. It is not necessarily the case that mutual recognition ‘emerged’ or ‘begun’ but simply that it is, and that it has necessary logical conditions that are presupposed by self-awareness.
In any case, if we take face-recognition or the recognition of another-being-like-me as the first concept, possibly with some additional minimal context, we can conceive of the ideation of the world to evolve from that minimal context. In this model everything is language, the world is a language, and there is nothing outside of language, and languages can be built on top of one another. For example, we could commonly conceive of what trees are like in the same way as we conceive of what human bodies are like, be able to point at a tree and expect another self to understand what we are pointing at, and then give trees a name in a higher-order language that could be spoken.
I think the vagueness of the object language is of the same scope as the vagueness of natural languages, or else we would never disagree about what we see. Since we can disagree about perceptions and how to categorise them, just like we can disagree about interpretations of linguistic expressions and whether it fits some unique perception, vagueness is necessary to accomodate new experiences, new transformations of meaning, or else nothing would fit, since everything we experience is in some sense unique.
As for no private language thesis, a simpler argument is possible, but I think we already agree on this per Wittgenstein. https://substack.com/@michaelkowalik/note/c-88032578
Your argument presents a really interesting synthesis of phenomenology, linguistics, and logic, particularly in linking Wittgenstein’s private language argument to a broader theory of meaning rooted in mutual recognition. I appreciate the clarity with which you frame the idea that meaning cannot be privately maintained and must be socially preserved. Your argument that a private language would either be redundant (because meaning is already understood in the present) or lost (if memory fails) provides a strong reinforcement of Wittgenstein’s thesis.
However, I’d like to probe a few areas further:
1. The Face as the First Meaningful Structure
Your claim that ‘the Face’—or, more precisely, the recognition of another-being-like-me—is the fundamental basis for meaning is compelling, particularly from a phenomenological perspective. Levinas, as you acknowledge, also sees the face-to-face encounter as the foundation of ethical and intersubjective experience. But does this position require rejecting the idea that meaning arises from pre-existing cognitive structures? That is, could one not argue that face-recognition itself depends on underlying neurological and evolutionary mechanisms? If so, would it not follow that some aspects of meaning predate mutual recognition, rather than emerging from it?
Additionally, by positing recognition as logically prior to all meaning, does this exclude cases where solitary cognitive processes (such as problem-solving, abstract thought, or even sensory perception) generate proto-meaning before social interaction occurs? Or is your claim that meaning is only meaningful when it is potentially shared?
2. The World as an ‘Object Language’
Your argument that physical reality itself constitutes a kind of "object language," evolving conceptually alongside human thought, is intriguing. But does this mean that the world itself is language, or merely that our understanding of it is always mediated through conceptual and linguistic structures? If the former, does this not risk collapsing the distinction between representation and reality?
Many linguistic and cognitive theories distinguish between the external world (which exists independently of our descriptions) and the linguistic/conceptual systems we impose upon it. Even Wittgenstein’s later work suggests that while language shapes our reality, it does not constitute it. How does your position engage with this distinction?
3. Vagueness in Object Language vs. Natural Language
Your analogy between vagueness in natural language and vagueness in the ‘object language’ is a strong one. We do, after all, disagree both about words and about how to categorise what we see. However, is vagueness a feature of the world itself, or a byproduct of how we describe it? In natural language, vagueness often stems from semantic flexibility, but in perception, it seems more tied to interpretative uncertainty or cognitive limitations. Would you say the vagueness of the ‘object language’ is an intrinsic feature of reality, or does it arise because all categorisation is necessarily approximate?
4. The Private Language Argument and Circularity
Your point about the impossibility of self-enforcing rules in private language is well stated. However, could the same circularity problem apply to public language? After all, linguistic meaning in public discourse is still maintained through mutual reinforcement within a system that refers to itself. If self-referentiality does not collapse public language, why must it necessarily collapse private language?
Additionally, does your argument about the ‘Face’ extend Wittgenstein’s private language argument beyond the linguistic into the ontological? That is, if mutual recognition is the foundation of meaning, then does that mean that all being is necessarily relational? If so, would this mean that the very concept of an ‘isolated mind’ (as in Descartes’ cogito) is fundamentally incoherent?
Your perspective provides a thought-provoking expansion of the private language argument, bringing in phenomenology, social cognition, and even metaphysical questions about the nature of reality and meaning. If your model fully holds, it seems to suggest a fundamentally relational account of existence itself, where there is no ‘self’ without recognition by an ‘other,’ and no meaning without a shared frame of reference. Would you see this as the natural conclusion of your position?
I really appreciate the depth of your argument, and I’d be interested in hearing how you see these questions playing into your broader philosophical framework."
1. When we speak of pre-cognitive conditions we are apply the standard model in which meaning is implicitly divided into two domains: objective reality and subjective thinking. We then purport to explain the former in terms of the latter. This works very well for most purposes, for individual/subjective consciousness, but at the point where we want to examine the beginning of all meaning, or the beginning of all consciousness, the model is revealed as logically inconsistent: it posits that there was meaning before there was the ability to think it, as if the concept of a tree existed before there were mounds that could define what a ‘tree’ means. The same applies to all concepts, including the idea of the pre-cognitive conditions of perception, including time. The cleanest way to consistently answer the question at this limit is to recognise that meaning therefore consciousness is all there is, that it is intrinsically a multiplicity of selves (each with its self-evident ‘I am’) which stabilises the distinction between the objective (the world as we know it) and the subjective (thoughts about the world as we know it). I first formulated and proven this model here: https://philpapers.org/rec/KOWODO, but a more developed statement of it is articulated in my recent book: https://michaelkowalik.substack.com/p/announcing-book-release
2. Calling the objective reality a language is a matter of classification; it need not be called that if someone insists otherwise, provided they describe it consistently. I use the term language because it fits its logical structure, which is that of constructed or evolved meaning that can change in time, that the meaning of physical properties is not absolutely fixed for all time, nor does it have an exact meaning that can be discovered. In that sense the label ‘language’, an object language, makes sense and avoids the false implication that it is exact and immutable in its meaning content. So I am not struck on the term, but I think it is a good fit for explaining how we communicate about the same world and how its meaning evolves for consciousness.
3. I think the above comments already capture this question.
4. Self-referentiality is logically inconsistent, so it collapses everything to non-sense, but it does not apply to public language because it is grounded by the intrinsic multiplicity of consciousness, which imperfectly mediates its relational closure without collapsing to direct-self reference. The imperfect references from self to self (vagueness) create a permanent misalignment, imbalance of meaning, therefore systemic non-closure, which is continuously compensated by consciousness changing in time.
The multiplicity relativises all instances of individuality by imperfect, mediated reference. This is precisely what makes consciousness possible and is therefore presupposed by consciousness, and goes back to the argument in the paper cited above. Yes, i consider it formally proven (in that paper) that the concept of a completely isolated mind, a monadic mind, is fundamentally incoherent.