Did Linguistic Philosophy Miss the Bigger Picture?
Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Language
Ernest Gellner (1925–1995), a philosopher and sociologist, offered one of the sharpest critiques of linguistic philosophy, particularly its Oxford variety championed by figures such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle. In Words and Things (1959), Gellner argued that linguistic philosophy, while initially promising, devolved into a self-referential and ultimately limiting intellectual exercise. This article explores Gellner’s perspective on language, philosophy, and the implications of his critique.
The Context of Gellner’s Critique
Linguistic philosophy emerged in the mid-20th century as a response to earlier traditions of metaphysics and epistemology. Its central tenet was that philosophical problems arise from misunderstandings of language and can be resolved through meticulous linguistic analysis. Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, particularly his concept of “language games,” epitomised this approach. Philosophical questions, in this view, were often dismissed as pseudo-problems stemming from misuse of ordinary language.
Gellner took issue with this narrow focus. He saw linguistic philosophy as a retreat from addressing substantive questions about the world, reducing philosophy to the analysis of linguistic practices. While it claimed to clarify thought, Gellner argued that instead it abdicated responsibility for engaging with reality.
Gellner’s Core Critiques
1. The Argument from Paradigm Cases
Linguistic philosophers often used the Argument from Paradigm Cases to settle philosophical disputes. They reasoned that because certain words or concepts are used in everyday language, their meaning and validity are inherently justified. For example, the concept of “free will” is validated by its everyday use in phrases like “He did it of his own free will.”
Gellner dismissed this as circular reasoning. Just because a term has conventional use does not mean it corresponds to reality or provides insight into complex philosophical issues. He likened this approach to Dr. Johnson “kicking a stone” to refute idealism, a crude and uncritical reliance on common sense.
2. The Contrast Theory of Meaning
A related idea, the Contrast Theory of Meaning, posits that a term derives meaning only through its contrast with what it does not cover. For example, “apple” is meaningful because it distinguishes apples from non-apples. Gellner acknowledged the intuitive appeal of this theory but criticised it for oversimplifying how language works. He argued that this fixation on contrasts ignored the complexity of linguistic and cognitive processes, reducing language to a set of rigid binaries.
3. The Misuse of Language Games
Wittgenstein’s concept of language games suggests that meaning arises from the specific contexts in which words are used. While this idea highlights the contextual nature of language, Gellner accused linguistic philosophers of overextending the metaphor. By treating all language as a collection of discrete games, they failed to address the interconnectedness of linguistic practices and their relationship to broader human concerns. Gellner also criticised the tendency to treat ordinary language as infallible, arguing that this approach stifled critical thought and innovation.
Philosophy as Diagnosis vs Philosophy as Inquiry
Gellner’s critique highlights a deeper philosophical divide: the role of philosophy itself. Linguistic philosophy saw its task as diagnosing and resolving linguistic confusions, aiming for a kind of intellectual euthanasia where philosophical problems would eventually disappear. Gellner, however, believed this was a betrayal of philosophy’s true purpose: to grapple with profound and often intractable questions about reality, knowledge, and existence.
He accused linguistic philosophy of intellectual complacency, describing it as a “secularised theology” that replaced rigorous inquiry with a rigid orthodoxy. For Gellner, philosophy should engage with the world, not retreat into linguistic analysis.
Implications and Legacy
Gellner’s critique of linguistic philosophy remains relevant today, particularly in debates about the scope and purpose of philosophy. While linguistic analysis has its merits, Gellner’s insistence on addressing broader intellectual and social issues challenges philosophers to move beyond narrow specialisations.
His work also serves as a cautionary tale against intellectual insularity. By highlighting the ideological and sociological dimensions of linguistic philosophy, Gellner reminds us that philosophical movements are not immune to the influence of historical and cultural forces.
Bigger Picture Missed?
Ernest Gellner’s philosophy of language is not merely a critique of linguistic philosophy but a call to restore philosophy’s broader mission. By exposing the limitations of focusing exclusively on language, Gellner challenges us to engage with the world’s complexities and uncertainties. In doing so, he reaffirms the enduring relevance of philosophy as a tool for understanding and navigating human existence.
©Antoine Decressac — 2025.
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Words and Things by Ernest Gellner. A foundational critique of linguistic philosophy, this book is sharp and polemical but also accessible to readers willing to grapple with its ideas. Gellner examines how linguistic philosophy abandoned broader inquiries into reality and knowledge, making it an essential read for understanding his perspective.
The Philosopher’s Toolkit: A Compendium of Philosophical Concepts and Methods by Julian Baggini and Peter S. Fosl. This guide explains key philosophical tools and ideas, including those related to language. It’s written in an approachable style, making it suitable for readers unfamiliar with technical philosophy.
Philosophical Investigations by Ludwig Wittgenstein. While challenging, this book is central to understanding the linguistic philosophy Gellner critiques. Wittgenstein’s exploration of language games and meaning provides crucial context for Gellner’s arguments.
Wittgenstein: A Very Short Introduction by A.C. Grayling. This short, accessible book summarises Wittgenstein’s ideas and their influence on linguistic philosophy. It’s ideal for readers seeking a concise overview before diving into Gellner’s critiques.
How to Think Like a Philosopher by Peter Cave. This engaging book introduces philosophical thinking with clarity and humour. It touches on various approaches to philosophy, including language and meaning, providing an accessible entry point for beginners.
Would love to have the time to write some extended responses to some of these things you've been writing about recently. Primarily because I feel that Wittgenstein's work, and how he is interpreted are being misrepresented just a bit.
With respect to a criticism such as "By treating all language as a collection of discrete games, they failed to address the interconnectedness of linguistic practices and their relationship to broader human concerns" it's not even clear to me what this criticism consists in.
For example, what is a "human concern", if "human concerns" are discourses (such as philosophy, psychology, physics, literature, politics and so on) then Wittgenstein's view of language is explanatorily adequate.
i.e. in §21 of Philosophical Investigations:
"Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence
the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form
of life.
Review the multiplicity of language-games in the following
examples, and in others:
Giving orders, and obeying them—
Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurementsConstructing an object from a description (a drawing)—
Reporting an event—
Speculating about an event—
Forming and testing a hypothesis—
Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams—
Making up a story; and reading it—
Play-acting—
Singing catches—
Guessing riddles—
Making a joke; telling it—
Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—
Translating from one language into another—
Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.
—It is interesting to compare the multiplicity of the tools in language
and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and
sentence, with what logicians have said about the structure of language."
-- this can hardly be said to be a view of language disconnected from human concerns, rather it is one *motivated by* trying to explain the connections of language to human concerns, rather than imagining language to be about mysterious glassy essences and sanitised, hidden theoretical constructs such as an innate/context free grammar somehow "in our brains" or a reduction to some formal logical system such as Russell and early Wittgenstein tried to demonstrate.
With regard to the criticism "[the purpose of philosophy, which Wittgenstein ignores is] to grapple with profound and often intractable questions about reality, knowledge, and existence", it's not as if Wittgenstein is unaware that people engage in philosophy in this way. The Tractatus (his earlier work) is one of the most influential books attempting to do this kind of philosophy, and Wittgenstein makes many references in his later work to these kinds of motivations. However, Wittgenstein provides reasons to think that these kinds of questions are a confusion of our grammar (in Wittgenstein's sense, our ways of forming questions), rather than a product of our minds representational relationship to "Reality".
PI §116: "When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being",
"object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence
of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually
used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—
What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their
everyday use."
PI §132-133: "We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use
of language: an order with a particular end in view; one out of many
possible orders; not the order. To this end we shall constantly be
giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of
language easily make us overlook. This may make it look as if we
saw it as our task to reform language.
Such a reform for particular practical purposes, an improvement in
our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice,
is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.
The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine
idling, not when it is doing work.
It is not our aim to refine or complete the system of rules for
the use of our words in unheard-of ways.
For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed complete clarity. But
this simply means that the philosophical problems should completely
disappear.
The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping
doing philosophy when I want to.—The one that gives philosophy
peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring itself
in question.—Instead, we now demonstrate a method, by examples;
and the series of examples can be broken off.—Problems are solved
(difficulties eliminated), not a single problem.
There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed
methods, like different therapies."
Of course, there are many things missing from Wittgenstein's theory. I believe that Wittgenstein's view of language is missing many empirical discoveries about language (which I believe only complement, refine and make richer his theory). Additionally, there are psychological questions about affect and salience that I believe are unanswered by Wittgenstein's work that even today are not really robustly understood but, I believe, are beginning to be answered by the 4E approach to psychology/cognitive science. Additionally, to work as a "whole" philosophical system I believe that Wittgenstein's view of language must be incorporated into a full Pragmatist account of action, and the human organism, and society (this becomes then a sociological and political explanation of humanity too -- which will also connect human practises to history). -- I believe there are various philosophers and school of thought who have attempted this, for example the Postmodernists contribute the most to the historic lens, various Pragmatist thinkers such as Schiller, Ramsay, Huw Price, Hasok Chang etc all contribute to the Pragmatist picture.
Overall I guess, just upset to see that I don't think Wittgenstein is getting his fair due. That being said, I do appreciate your explication of schools of thought in linguistics that oppose and challenge my own views so please do continue.
We need to go even deeper to truly understand 'How Language Works'. I've posting on how language shapes perception and the illusion that we're a 'subject' looking out at a world of 'objects .'
https://hertzhoward.substack.com/p/how-does-language-work?r=18ndhf